While belief functions may be seen formally as a generalization of probabilistic distributions, the question of the interactions between belief functions and probability is still an issue in practice. This question is difficult, since the contexts of use of these theory are notably different and the semantics behind these theories are not exactly the same. A prominent issue is increasingly regarded by the community, that is the management of the conflicting information. Recent works have introduced new rules for handling the conflict redistribution while combining belief functions. The notion of conflict, or its cancellation by an hypothesis of open world, seems by itself to prevent a direct interpretation of belief function in a probabilistic framework. This paper addresses the question of a probabilistic interpretation of belief functions. It first introduces and implements a theoretically grounded rule, which is in essence an adaptive conjunctive rule. It is shown, how this rule is derived from a logical interpretation of the belief functions by means of a probabilistic multimodal logic; in addition, a concept of source independence is introduced, based on a principle of entropy maximization.
Introduction
In [2, 3] , A. Dempster introduced an elegant modelling of imprecise probabilistic beliefs, which formally implies a generalisation of probability, and a process for infering combinations of these beliefs. This seminal work completed by G. Shafer [4] initiated the theory of belief functions for manipulating uncertain and imprecise information. However, while belief functions may be seen formally as a generalization of probabilistic distributions, the question of the interactions between belief functions and probability is still an issue in practice. Indeed, the contexts of use of these theory are notably different implying slightly different semantics in background. On the one hand, belief functions may deal with non technical sources of information, and as a consequence are also confronted inherently to conflictual information. On the other hand, the contexts of use of probability and bayesian reasonning are more technical and controlled, and prevent, for the most part, the issues of conflictual information. It is often necessary to map the belief information to the probabilistic information for actual applications. As will be shown subsequently, some issue for a probabilistic interpretation of belief function is implied by the notion of conflict between the sources, which is a product of the conjunctive combination rule for fusing belief function. The conflict and the management of the conflict in the combination rules are topics of increasing interest for the community Recent works have proposed evolutions of the historical rule of Dempster and Shafer (DS) for managing the conflict; Lefevre and al explicitely introduced this issue [9] , and many rule constructions followed [5, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14] . Especially, Florea, Jousselme and al [8] proposed a family of rules which is adaptive with the conflict level. In this case, there is an important idea: the redistribution policy is now changing automatically as a function of the conflict. But this concern for the conflict is not new, and are for example ingredients of the famous rules of Dubois&Prade [6, 7] or Yager [17] .
The notion of conflict may be cancelled by an hypothesis of open world [15] , but this open world hypothesis does not map to the common formalisms of probability, and have to be interpreted. By the way, the open world hypothesis does not prevent any practical consideration of the conflict [16] implied by the interpretation of the belief put on the empty set. This paper addresses the question of a probabilistic interpretation of belief functions. It is the continuation of reflexions done in [19, 20] , which introduced and implemented a theoretically grounded rule, obtained by applying a principle of sources independence based entropy maximization. This rule is in essence an adaptive conjunctive rule, where the conflict redistribution is automatically derived from the considered independence principle. It is shown that this rule identifies to the conjunctive rule in cases without conflict. This rule is an introduction to the definition and study of a multimodal logic for modelling beliefs, since it is indeed derived from this logic by applying the independence principle. We point out by means of the axiomatizations how the conflict may be interpreted from the logical level.
This paper is divided in two parts. The first part introduces a methodology for computing combination rules, on the basis of an entropic principle for defining the independence between the sources.
It is started by a general discussion about belief functions in section 2. Section 3 settles a new methodology for deriving the combination rule, based on an entropic notion of sensor independence.
Then, section 4 discusses about the properties of the new rule and the implementations. A small example is considered as an illustration, but since the purpose of this paper is mainly theoretical, these experimental aspects are not developped. The second part exposes the logical fundaments of our methodology. Section 7 provides some logical backgrounds and introduces the definition of the multimodal logic. In section 8, it is shown how a logical combination rule is derivable from the logic.
In section 9, a non trivial model is defined, and properties concerning the probabilistic extension of the logic are deduced. Belief combination rules are then derived theoretically from the logical rule, by applying a maximization of the entropic information. Section 10 concludes.
Part I
A combination rule based on the entropy maximization principle 2 Overview
Frame of discernment
In order to manipulate the information, it is necessary to have an algebraic representation of the events of the system. Various structures [21, 23] have been introduced recently, and in the most general case, distributive lattices may be used for this algebraic representation [23] . In this paper, however, we will restrict our reflexion to Boolean algebras, and especially to power sets, which are the historical and prominent structures used by the belief function community.
Definition 1 (frame of discernment). It is given a finite Boolean algabra B = (G, ∩, ∪, ∼, ∅, Ω) and a subset Θ ⊂ G of propositions, called frame of discernment, which generates G. 1 The frame of discernment Θ is the set of basical known events of our model, and the Boolean algebra B describes the logical interaction between the basical event of Θ. Subsequently, the notations B Θ ∆ = B and G Θ ∆ = G are used, in order to mark the structures with their frames of discernment.
While this paper addresses the general case of Boolean structures, it is known that power sets are sufficiently versatile structures, which may be equivalent representations of any finite Boolean algebra, and may as well include as substructures some lattice structures, like hyperpower sets [21] ,.
Thus, a fundamental example of Boolean structure B Θ is the example of power sets.
Example 2 (power set).
• The frame of discernment identifies to singletons of a set Ω, so that
• The Boolean algebra B Θ identifies to the algebra of the subsets of Ω, so that G Θ = 2 Ω , and ∩, ∪, ∼, ∅, Ω are respectiveley the set intersection, set union, set complement, the empty set and the entire set Ω .
1 Which means that G is the set of all propositions derived from ∅, Ω, the elements of Θ and the operators ∩, ∪, ∼ .
Belief

Basic belief asignment
The information from different sources or expert is not reducible to the only logical representation.
Information of real life are typically uncertain and imprecise and come with an uncertainty degree, or belief. In belief function theory, the basic belief assignment (bba) is a belief density, describing the information intrinsic to each proposition. This intrinsic information is the fraction of information of the proposition which is not inherited from connex propositions. There are two definitions of bba related respectively to an open world or a closed world hypothesis. The theory of Transferable Belief Model, as defined by Smets [15] , implements typically the open world hypothesis. While the bba describes the information intrinsic to each proposition, the full belief of a proposition is potentially the compilation of the basic beliefs connex to this proposition.
There is a pessimistic bound and an optimistic bound for the belief of a propostion, which are the credibility and the plausibility.
Definition 4 (credibilty function).
The cedibility Bel related to a bba m is defined for any X ∈ G Θ by:
The credibility is a pessimistic bound, only talking into account the belief of the propositions known with certainty.
Definition 5 (plausibility function). The plausibility is defined by Pl(X) = 1 − Bel(∼ X) for any
Combination rules
A main contribution of the theory of belief functions consists in the combination rules. It is assumed that two or more sources of information are providing a viewpoint about the universe. These viewpoints are described by specific bba for each source. The question then is to make a unique representation of the information, i.e. a unique bba, from these several bbas.
Conjunctive rule
The conjunctive rule belief functions is a rule of reference for combining belief functions with the open world hypothesis. It is applied for fusing independent sources of information. 
It is proved that m 1 ⊕ ∩ m 2 is a bba when m 1 and m 2 are bbas. However, the quantity m 1 ⊕ ∩ m 2 (∅) , called degree of conflict, is not necessary zero, even if both m 1 and m 2 meet the constraint an acceptable combination rule when the open world hypothesis is made, like in the TBM, but it is not acceptable in general when the closed world hypothesis is done.
However, there are classes of bbas for which the conjunctive rule is admissible for the closed world hypothesis, that is bbas restricted to Boolean substructures for which contradiction ∅ cannot be derived from the conjunction ∩. In [21, 25] , Dezert and Smarandache proposed such a structure, the hyperpower set. On such structure, the conjunctive rule does not generate conflict and is admissible even with the closed world hypothesis.
Conflict management with the closed world hypothesis
In the general case, the conjunctive rule generates a degree of conflict, which is not complient with the closed world hypothesis. While many rules are based on the conjunctive rule, a management of the conflict is necessary and is implemented specifically by each rule.
Dempster-Shafer rule. The historical rule of Dempster-Shafer [3, 4] is based on the conjunctive rule, but handles the conflict as a normalization parameter. 
where
is the degree of conflict and:
Rules defined from a confict redistribution. Variety of rules have been proposed recently [5, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14] , especially based on a conflict redistribution [9] . We will not give here a description of all these rules, but a principle of construction is proposed.
The principle is to construct a combination rule from the conjunctive rule by redistributing the conflict. Being given a redistribution function r, it is defined the combination rule ⊕ r by:
for any X ∈ G Θ . The redistribution function r should be typically such that:
and:
But there are examples of redistribution laws [8] where the constraint (6) is relaxed. However, in this approach of Florea, Jousselme and al, the redistribution function is conditionned by the conflict
, which is a more specific conditionner than m 1 , m 2
There are many possible rules deduced from the redistribution principle. Dempster-Shafer rule is among these rules:
In this case, the redistribution is proportionnal to the conjunctively fused belief.
The PCR5 (Proportional Conflict Redistribution no. 5) rule [13, 14] is another rule deduced from a redistribution of the conflict, i.e. ⊕ PCR5 = ⊕[r PCR5 ] where:
for any X ∈ G Θ \ {∅} . Under that form, it appears clearly that PCR5 is based on a local conflict redistribution, attributed proportionnaly to the input basic belief. In the next sections, we derive a theoretically grounded ruling method, for which the conflict redistribution is implied by a new concept of independence of the sources. The new rules are essentially computed from an entropic optimization problem.
Entropic approach for the rule definition
To begin with this new rule concept, we directly settle the concrete optimization principles of our method. The logical justification comes later in part II.
Independent sources and entropy
The idea is not completely new, and the entropy maximization principle has been linked to the conjunctive rule in [25] . It is noticed, that ⊕ ∩ could be derived from an entropic maximization:
where:
under constraints:
Equation (7) has a particular interpretation in the paradigm of information theory: f o is the law with maximal ignorance of the interaction between the marginal variables Y and Z, owing to the fact that the marginal law are m 1 and m 2 . By the way, independent sources of information should indeed provide a maximal ignorance of interaction between the maginal variables, so that the maximization of entropy appears as the good way to characterize independent sources. Since, in this case, the constraints are limited to the marginalizations, the solution to this maximization is:
where is recognized the joint law of two independent variables. The definition (7) works when the open world hypothesis is done. But when the closed world is hypothesized, new constaints are implied and have to be added to the optimization problem. In regards to these considerations, a generalization of the notion of independance between variables is introduced now, and will be used for the definition of a new rule of combination.
Independance of constrained variables
Definition 8 (constrained independance). Let be given the variables X 1:s defined over the finite sets E 1:s respectively. Let ρ o be a probability density defined over the joint variable (X 1:s ) and let ρ 1:s be the marginals of ρ o over the variables X 1:s respectively. Let ϕ(·) be the constraint defined by
Boolean mapping defined on any joint probability density ρ. Then, the variables X 1:s are independant in regards to the probability density ρ o and to the constraint ϕ(·) ≥ 0 if and only if ρ o is the solution of the following optimization:
with respect to : ρ ≥ 0 , the marginality constraints :
It is noticed that this concept is dependent of the variables set. For example, it is not necessary true that the variables of the subsequence X i 1 , · · · , X i k are independant in regards to the constraints, when X 1:s are. There is an exception however, when there is no constraint, i.e. ϕ(ρ) is always − − → true.
In such a case, it is proven by applying Kuhn-Tucker theorem that ρ(X 1:
The notion of constrained independance is now applied to the definition of a combination rule; the sets are E i = G Θ , and the constraint may be defined by ϕ = (ϕ X 1:s ) X 1:s ∈G Θ , where:
After simplification, this construction results in the following definition of the fusion rule. 
Entropy maximizing rule for a closed world
Corollary of the definition 10. ⊕ H is compliant with the closed world hypothesis.
Conflict management. In the definition of rule ⊕ H , the independence of the sources has been implemented practically by an entropic maximization principle. From this principle, the confict management is implied automatically. Nevertheless, the rule ⊕ H is also able to reject the sources, when they are considered as definitively non compatible. The fundamental incompatibility of the sources is related to the feasibility of the constraints in (9) . Belief functions may be used for fusing subjective information, and different logical background and constraints should be considered for such information. However, the entropy maximization principle may be combined with many kinds of constraints, and we have potentially a general principle for defining rules.
Properties and implementation
This section is devoted to the development of basic properties of EMR and to practical implementation on examples. The following definitions and notations are used in this section.
Definition 11 (probabilistic bba). A bba m is said to be probabilistic if there are propositions
Moreover, when X 1 , · · · , X m are minimal non empty elements, that is:
then m is called a probability density over G Θ and the credibility Bel related to m is called the probability measure on G Θ derived from m.
Notations. Subsequently, m 1 , · · · , m s are bbas on G Θ compliant with the closed world hypothesis.
It is denoted by Bel i ⊕ H Bel j the credibility function related to m i ⊕ H m j . It is denoted by ρ a probability density over G Θ and by P the probability measure on G Θ derived from ρ . Now, we have first to explain some notions about belief sharpening and its converse, belief weakening.
Belief weakening is commonly used by the community, especially when a reliability degree of the information is taken into account. These notions are introduced now, with some refinements. They are necessary subsequently.
Belief sharpening
Definition 12 (belief sharpening). A sharpening from m 1 to m 2 is a mapping r 12 :
such that r 12 ≥ 0 , and:
It is noticed that this definition implies:
A sharpening will move the basic belief from propositions to subpropositions, thus resulting in a more accurate assignment of the basic belief. We will also say that m 2 is a sharpening of m 1 , or conversely that m 1 is a weakening of m 2 , when exists a sharpening from m 1 to m 2 . We will equivalently write the ⊳ relation for credibility functions:
It is noticed that the sharpening implies an order relation on belief functions. 
Property 13 (equivalence relation). Define the relation ⊳ on belief functions by:
is a sharpening from Bel 1 to Bel 3 , ⊳ is reflexive. More precisely, there is only one sharpening r from Bel to Bel , which is defined by 
Proof is done in appendix A.
Proof is done in appendix A. The converse is false.
Example 15 (counterexample). Assume:
and define:
It is obvious that Bel
Property 16. Probability measures are minimal for ⊳. More precisely:
The result is a direct consequence of the definitions.
2 Since r12(X1, X2) ≤ m2(X2) and r23(X2, X3) ≤ m2(X2) , it is noticed that (11) is well defined by setting 
Properties of EMR
Property 18 (neutral element). Define the bba of total ignorance ν by ν(Ω) = 1 . Then:
Proof is given in appendix A.
Property 19 (conservation of belief). Assume that m 1 ⊕ H · · · ⊕ H m s exists. Then:
Corollary 20.
The existence of
This result is a sufficient criterion for proving the non-existence of
Property 22 (combination of dominated belief functions). Assume that Bel
Proof. Let r i be a sharpening from Bel i to Bel, for i = 1 : s. Since r i (X i , X) ≤ m(X), it is set:
Then, define:
From the definition of r i (X i , X), it is clear that:
As a consequence of this and of m(∅) = 0, it comes that:
Now, it is also derived:
Since it is also clear that f ≥ 0 , so there is a solution to the optimization (9).
Property 23 (probabilistic bound). EMR is coherent with the probabilistic bounds:
The interpretation of this result may not be obvious. It says that, when the sources of information are weakenings of a probabilistic law, then their fusion with this law exists and confirms the law.
However, the fused bba Bel 1 ⊕ H · · · ⊕ H Bel s obtained from the sources Bel 1:s alone is not necessary compatible with a probability P such that Bel i ⊳ P for any i = 1 : s . In particular:
This result is an indirect consequence of the fact that ⊕ H will add information by means of the independence principle. This is illustrated by the following counterexample.
Example 24 (counterexample). Let m 1 , m 2 and ρ be defined of over G Θ :
It comes out that Bel 1 ⊳ P and Bel 2 ⊳ P by redistributing the masses from A ∪ B to A and from 
Property 25 (associativity). EMR is not associative.
The counterexample of section 23 turns out to be a counterexample for the associativity.
As a consequence, one have to distinguish between (
Property 26 (idempotence). EMR is not indempotent, but it is proved:
Algorithm
The optimization (9) is convex and is not difficult. However, its size increases exponentially. The
The following algorithm, based on the projected gradient, has been implemented:
1. Initialize t = 0 and the convergence step θ 0 , 2. Find a feasible solution f 0 to the constraints of (9); a simplex is solved. If such a solution does not exist, then stop: the combination is not possible. Otherwise, continue on next step.
3. Build ∆f t by solving the quadratic program:
under constraints: 
6. Set t := t + 1 and reiterate from step 3 until full convergence.
Experimentation
We will consider the fusion of m 1 and m 2 defined on the power set of {a, b, c} by:
Notice that Zadeh's example is a subcase where defined by α 1 = β 2 = 0, 99 and γ 1 = γ 2 = 0.01 .
The table 1 summarize the results of combnation by ⊕ H for various cases. These examples express clearly the property of belief conservation, and the capacity of EMR to reject any combination which is not compatible with this property.
Conclusion
The rule EMR is a theoretically grounded combination rule, defined on the basis of:
• constraints expressing the belief conservation, which is a desirable property,
• an hypothesis of sources independence, which is generalized by means of a principle of information maximization.
The good news is that such a rule exists. Especially, it is complient with the probabilistic bound property as expressed in section 23. The bad news is that such a rule is quite constraining and cannot be associative. Here comes a fundamental point related to the use of the hypothesis of independence. This hypothesis introduces information which may imply some conflicts with the ground truth expressed by means of a probability of reference P . The properties of sections 22
(combination of dominated belief functions) and 23 express that. More precisely, it is possible to combine as many sources of information (even P itself!) which is compatible with P , so as to make the best approximation of P :
But as soon as the rule has been applied, the introduction of information by means of the independence principle may implies conflicts with the ground truth:
This finding leads us to question about the hypotheses of implementation of belief combination rules, at least in the context of a closed universe. We could give up with the property of belief conservation:
this is actually what most rules do in practice, when redistributing the conjunctive conflict. We could resign ourself to implement the combination rule just as a final step of the fusion process, as this is 
Belief functions, modality and probability
Belief functions may be seen as a generalization of probabilistic distributions by combining imprecisions within the uncertainty. Belief functions are caracterized by the notion of basic belief assignment which will assign a basic belief to any element of the Boolean algebra. In this way, bbas may be seen as a generalization of probabilistic densities, which assign probabilistic densities to the minimal elements of the Boolean algebra. This difference implies the ability of belief functions for manipulating imprecise information. It has also an algebraic consequence, by replacing the additivity property by the sub-additivity property. The qualification of belief functions as a generalization of probabilities has been questionned, by arguing that belief functions were subcases of random sets.
While this is true in some manner, an elementary interpretation of this theory by means of random sets is not able to seize some semantic subtilities behind belief functions.
However, there is another way to concile probabilities and belief functions. This could be done by introducing the semantic at a logical level. While probabilities are constructed on a classical logical framework (Boolean algebras), it is still possible to implement probabilities on a non classical logic, and this how we will interpret belief functions. In [26] , Ruspini derived a logical counterpart of the credibility function by means of an epistemic operator K representing the knowledge of the source of information. This operator was in fact related to the modal operator of system S5. He proposed a logical counterpart of basic belief assignment, i.e. the epistemic proposition denoted e(X), derived from logical combinations of the modal propositions as follows:
Subsequently, an equivalent construction is proposed on the basis of a multimodal logic. In our model, Bel i (X), the credibility of X according to sensor i, is interpreted as the probability
Ruspini also introduced the principle of a logical combination rule:
This combination rule is in fact an immediate consequence of an elaborated axiom directly inspired from the conjunctive combination rule formulated on the credibility functions:
Subsequently, we will go a step further in this way by deriving the logical combination rule (16) from axioms of a multimodal logic. These axioms will be related to elementary properties of our deduction system. 
Definition of a multimodal logic
This section introduces a multimodal logic which is the backbone for a logical interpretaion of the rule EMR. This logic has been previously introduced in [18] .
Language definition
It is defined a finite set, P, called the set of atomic propositions. Atomic propositions of P are denoted p, q, r, · · · For simplicity, it will be assumed subsequently that the atomic propositions describe a partition, that is the conjunction of different atomic propositions is the contradiction and the disjunction of all atomic propositions is a tautology. Although these strong hypotheses depart from usual axiomatization of classical logic, it is not a restriction, since it is known that is possible to construct a free Boolean algebra by means of a power set.
It is defined the finite set I = {1, · · · , n}, describing n sources of information.
Definition 27 (classical propositions). The set L C of classical propositions is defined recursively
The classical propositions describe the logical information on the real world.
Definition 28 (simple modal propositions). The set L C[C] of simple modal propositions are defined recursively by
any X ∈ L C and any non empty J ⊆ I .
, modalities are only applied to classical propositions, resulting in a language free of nested modalities. This language contains all necessary elements for defining the belief reasonning at a logical level. Nevertheless, it is not closed under the modal operators, and the language of all modal propositions is prefered for this logical study. A multimodal logic is defined subsequently, by means of axioms and deductions rules. A proposition which is deduced from these axioms and rules is called a theorem. The following definition will be usefull subsequently:
Definition 29 (modal propositions). The set L of modal propositions is defined recursively by
Definition 30. For any finite set of propositions E ⊂ L, it is defined:
is often used subsequently.
Definition 31 (logical equivalence). The logical equivalence ≡ is defined by:
X ≡ Y if and only if X → Y and Y → X are theorems.
Axioms.
The multimodal logic is defined by the following rules and axioms defined for any propositions X, Y ∈ L and subsets J, K ⊆ I :
Classical axioms.
Atomic propositions form a partition. vP is an axiom and (p ∧ q) → ⊥ is an axiom , for any atomic propositions p, q ∈ P such that p = q , Modus ponens. If X and X → Y are theorems, then Y is a theorem ,
Modal rules and axioms:
N . If X is a theorem, then [J]Y is a theorem ,
Ind. Let E ⊆ P be a subset of atomic propositions. Using the notation (18), the following proposition is an axiom: It is assumed subsequently that the reader is familiar with classical propositional logic and its main results. Some results are recalled subsequently about the logical equivalence.
Logical equivalence
Owing to the axioms and rules of classical logic, ≡ is an equivalence relation on the propositions of L. The equivalence class of a proposition X ∈ L for the logical equivalence is denoted ⌊X⌋. Let F ⊆ L . The set of equivalence classes of propositions X ∈ F is also denoted ⌊F ⌋ .
The logical operators are naturally infered on the classes of propositions. For example, it is defined
. . An order relation is also defined over ⌊L⌋.
Definition 32 (logical order).
⌊X⌋ ⊆ ⌊Y ⌋ if and only if X → Y is a theorem.
The notation ⌊X⌋ ⌊Y ⌋ is used when ⌊X⌋ ⊆ ⌊Y ⌋ and ⌊X⌋ = ⌊Y ⌋ .
Owing to the axioms, there is an morphism between 2 P and ⌊L C ⌋. :
Definition 33 (morphism). For any classical proposition X ∈ L C , it is defined pX be the set of atomic propositions such that ⌊p⌋ ⊆ ⌊X⌋.
Property 34 (morphism). Any classical proposition is equivalent to proposition vpX :
For any E, F ⊆ P , it is also derived:
These are clear consequences of classical propositional logic.
8 Deriving the combination rules
Preliminary results
Some useful logical theorems are now derived. These theorems are deduced without the help of the optional axiom T .
Property 35 (modality is non-decreasing).
If
This result is a direct consequence of N and K .
Property 36 (modality and conjunction).
This result is a consequence of the theorems (
N and K.
Property 37 (modality and disjunction).
This result is a consequence of the theorems
Property 38 (conjunction of heterogeneous modalities).
Deduced from theorems
Property 39 (disjunction of heterogeneous modalities).
Immediate consequence of Inc.
Logical combination rule
Preliminary definitions
The notion of partition will be useful for defining the logical combination.
Definition 40 (partition). A set of propositions, Π ⊆ L is a partition of ⊤ if it satisfies:
• The propositions of Π are exclusive :
• The propositions of Π are exhaustive: X∈Π X ≡ ⊤ .
Notice that Π may contain ⊥, in this definition. The following property is a direct consequence of the definition.
Property 41. Let Π and Λ be two partitions of ⊤. Then:
• The set of joint propositions Γ = {X ∧ Y / X ∈ Π and Y ∈ Λ} is a partition.
Logical combination
Principle of the logical combination. Let J, K ⊆ I be sources subsets, and X be any classical Definition 42 (basic logical assignments). Let E ⊆ P The basic logical assignment (bla) related to the classical proposition vE and to sources subset J is the modal proposition (J)vE defined by:
The bla (J)vE is the logical information, which the sources of set J attribute to proposition vE intrinsically. The information of (J)vE cannot be attributed to classical propositions smaller than vE. From the morphism property 34, the definition extends to ⌊L C ⌋ :
Definition 43 (bla on classes). For any ⌊X⌋ ∈ ⌊L C ⌋ , the basic logical assignment for ⌊X⌋ is defined by (J)⌊X⌋ ∆ = (J)⌊vpX⌋ . The bla (J)⌊X⌋ is also alternatively defined by:
The blas have interesting properties, which will imply the definition of a logical combination.
Property 44 (exclusivity). The blas (J)vE, where E ⊆ P, are exclusive:
Proof is given in appendix B.
Property 45 (exhaustivity). The blas (J)vE, where E ⊆ P, are exhaustive:
, and in particular:
Corollary 46 (inversion). It is possible to define [J]
⌊X⌋ from the blas (J)⌊Y ⌋ :
It is deduced from these results that bbas constitute partitions:
Corollary 47 (bla partition). The blas (J)vE, where E ⊆ P, constitute a partition of ⊤ .
Corollary 48 (joint bla partition). Let J, K ⊆ I. The propositions (J)vE ∧ (K)vF , where E, F ⊆ P, constitute a partition of ⊤ .
Based on these partitions, it is possible to express the logical combination:
Property 49 (computing the combination).
Corollary 50.
The proof of the main property will apply the following lemma.
Lemma 51.
[
Proofs are given in appendix B.
Property 52 (generalized combination). The combination (32) happens to be associative and may be extended to s sources:
Processus of logical fusion
As a conclusion, the fused sources J ∪ K is computed from sources J and K as follows:
• Build (H)⌊X⌋ by means of (27) for H = J, K ,
• Compute (J ∪ K)⌊X⌋ by means of (32)
• Derive [J ∪ K]⌊X⌋ by means of (30), for any ⌊X⌋ ∈ ⌊L C ⌋ .
Model and consequences
In this section, a model is constructed for the logic. This model is not complete, when embeded modalities are considered. However, if we restrict to the set of simple modal propositions, L C[C] , the model has some completude properties, which will be useful for deriving the belief combination from the logical combination. The model is not based on a Kripke constuction.
Model
Definition
Two models are constructed for the logic respectively without and with the optional axiom T . The models are quite similar, except for the minimal elements, denoted φ(· · ·). The elements φ(p 0 , E 1:n )
are defined for any p 0 ∈ P and any E 1:n ⊆ P by:
• Without axiom T :
• With axiom T :
For any proposition p ∈ P , it is defined:
For any E ⊆ P , it is also defined: E = p∈E p .
Then, the model X of any proposition X ∈ L is defined recursively by:
• p = p for any p ∈ P and ⊤ = P ,
• For any non empty J ⊆ I and X ∈ L, it is defined:
Other connectors are defined from ∨ , ¬ and [J] , e.g.
Property 53 (classical propositions). Let X ∈ L C be a classical proposition. Then, it is clear from the definition, that there is E ⊂ P such that X = E.
Interpretation
Subsequently, we are assuming X, X i , Y ∈ L C and p ∈ P . It is assumed E i ⊂ X i such that
It is easily shown that:
In fact, it is implied from propositions (29) and (33) , the set of simple modal propositions, is equivalent to a disjunction of propositions like p ∧ i=1:n (i)X i . Now, in the case where axioms T also holds, it is easily derived that:
which is the logical counterpart of the definition of (35). It follows from these remarks that our model (assuming that it fulfills actually the axioms) have completude property while restricted to
, so that:
In the case, where axiom T does hold, it is also noticed that the following characteristic constraints is obtained for the simple modal propositions:
From the model definition, it is also clear that this constraint is sufficient to infer the consequence of axiom T on the modal propostions. This discussion about the models is now completed by verifying the axioms.
Axioms checking
The classical axioms are implied since the model is a power set. Other axioms are derived as follows.
Property 54 (axioms verification).
P artition: p∈P p = ⊤ and p ∧ q = ⊥ = ∅ , for p, q ∈ P such that p = q ,
when the model follows definition (35).
Proofs indications are given in appendix B.
From logical combination to belief combination
The interpretation of belief functions and belief combinations by means of modal propositions needs the concept of probability over logical propositions.
Definition 55 (probability on logical propositions). Let ⌊F⌋ ⊂ ⌊L⌋ be a finite set of propositions of ⌊L⌋ , closed under the classical operators ( i.e. → and ⊥ and derived operators). A probability distribution over ⌊F⌋ is a mapping P : ⌊F⌋ → IR such that:
Now, it is assumed s sensors characterized by the subsets J 1:s ⊆ I , such that J i ∩ J j = ∅ for any i = j . The logical framework ⌊F⌋ is then constructed as a classical closure of the sets of simple
The set ⌊F⌋ is a finite set. It happens from previous properties that the propositions i=1:s (J i )⌊Y i ⌋, for ⌊Y 1:s ⌋ ∈ ⌊L C ⌋, constitute a partition generating ⌊F⌋ and that [ i=1:s J i ] ⌊X⌋ ∈ ⌊F⌋ . It is then possible to define the notion of belief, based on a probability defined over the framework ⌊F⌋ .
Definition 56 (belief as probabilistic modality). It is defined Bel i (⌊X⌋)
for i = 1 : s and for any ⌊X⌋ ∈ ⌊L C ⌋ .
From this definition and the properties of (J), especially property (33), a definition of the bbas and of their combinations is recovered.
Property 57 (logical definition of bba). m i (⌊X⌋) = P ((J i )⌊X⌋) , and:
In order to reduce P ( i=1:s (J i )⌊Y i ⌋) , the independence of the disjoint sources J 1:s is instrumental in a probabilistic paradigm. The idea is to compute P ( i=1:s (J i )⌊Y i ⌋) by maximizing the entropy of P over the logical framework ⌊F⌋:
Combining ( • Axiom T is removed. Then, it is possible to have i=1:
as seen in the model construction. As a consequence, the optimization implies the conjunctive rule. We are in the hypothesis of an open world.
• Axiom T is used. As seen in the model construction, this axiom reduces in the constraint (39) for the simple modal propositions. As a consequence, it is necessary to consider the constraint
This results in the following implied constraint in the optimization (41):
The rule EMR is thus derived, from a logical interpretation. Moreover, we are able to dis- 
Conclusion
A new combination rule have been defined for combining belief functions. This rule is derived from a logical derivation, based on axioms of a multimodal logic, and from a principle of sources independence, based on the maximization of the system entropy. This contribution implies a versatile framework for defining the combination rules and their implied intuition. Indeed, it is possible to derive many other logics for defining the notion of belief and their combination at a logical level.
In this contribution especially, we proposed a logic with strong but desirable properties, and we derived some conlusions about the feasibility of the related combinations. These properties are typically the conservation of belief during the combination, and the compliance with a probabilistic ground truth. It appeared that such a rule is theoretically constructible. But however, it appeared that as soon as the principle of independence is used, it introduces information which imply a bias which is conflicting in general with the ground truth. This information should be used at the final stage of the fusion, which is a strong constraint on the fusion process. We then questioned about the need to release the principle of belief conservation (as do most rules with conflict redistribution) or to abandon the compliance with a ground truth reference. We also suggested that these issues may be solved by using conditional belief functions more thoroughly instead of absolute belief functions. 
Probabilistic bound -property 23 -
Proof. The existence of Bel 1 ⊕ H · · · ⊕ H Bel s ⊕ H P is a consequence of the combination of dominated belief function, since, indeed, P ⊳ P .
From the conservation of belief, it happens:
Since P is a probability measure, it is minimal and the property is implied.
Idempotence -property 26 -m is probabilistic ⇒ m ⊕ H · · · ⊕ H m = m .
Proof. Since m is probabilistic, there are X 1:n ∈ G Θ \ {∅} such that: n j=1 m(X j ) = 1 and i = j ⇒ X i ∩ X j = ∅ , n j=1 X j = Ω . As a consequence, the only function f , which fulfills the constraint of (9) , is defined by: f (X, · · · , X) = m(X) for any X ∈ G Θ .
Of this, the property is an immediate consequence.
B Proofs of section 8 and 9
Bla exclusivity -property 44 -Proof. It is noticed that E ∩ F E or E ∩ F F when E = F . Then, the proof is achieved by deriving: 
